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GENEVA MELDRUM \ 
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_vs . \ Case No. 





APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS IGNORES THE 
REAL BASIS FOR THE LAWSUIT, AND THE BASIS OF 
THE COURT'S DECISION, TO-WIT: AN INTERPRETA-
TION OF THE 1964 CONTRACT. 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Appellant, in his statement of facts, ignores the real 
issue of the Lawsuit and the basis of the Court's decision, as 
he attempted to do throughout the trial of this matter. 
On April 1, 1964, the Plaintiff, as seller, entered into a 
wirtten contract of sale with the Defendant for the purpose 
of selling her one-half interest in cattle, farm machinery, and 
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a ranch in Juab County. A copy of the 1964 contract between 
the Plaintiff and the Defendant is attached to the Plaintiff's 
Complaint. (R.6) The contract price was $40,000.00, and 
inasmuch as the sale was made from mother to son, no 
interest was to be charged on the agreement. However, on 
page 5 of the written agreement paragraph 5. C. c. read as 
follows: 
c. That in the event that buyer sells his interest in 
the above described property or assigns this contract 
during the lifetime of the seller for a sum in excess of 
the purchase price herein., Forty Thousand Dollars 
($40,000.00), that in such event he will pay one-half 
of the excess thereof over $40,000.00 to the seller 
herein, from the first three payments under such sale. 
(R. l l ) 
On or about November 1, 1968, the Plaintiff and the 
Defendant joined with James R. Meldrum in executing a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to sell the ranch property to 
Lowell H. Rasmussen and Barbara Fraser Rasmussen, husband 
and wife, for a total purchase price of $158,000.00. 
$79,000.00 was for the real property sold by the Plaintiff to 
the Defendant under the 1964 Contract. A copy of the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract was attached to Plaintiff's 
Complaint and referred to as the Rasmussen Contract. (R. 12) 
Some time after the Rasmussen contract had been 
entered into by the parties, a question arose concerning the 
interpretation of paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract as 
quoted hereinabove. Plaintiff understood the paragraph to 
mean that she would receive an additional $19,500.00, 
(1/2 of the excess over $40,000.00) from the first three 
payments received on the Rasmussen contract, the Defend-
ant took the view that a sale had not been made until such 
2 
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time as he had been paid in full on the Rasmussen contract, 
at which time he would then pay to the Plaintiff the 
$19,500.00 to which she was entitled under said paragraph. 
Defendant took the further view that even if the Rasmussen 
contract were paid in full, and the property deeded to the 
Buyers, that he would be under no obligation to pay to the 
Plaintiff the full balance due and owing on the 1964 con-
tract, but could continue to make the yearly payments of 
$2,500.00, without interest, until the total purchase price 
of $40,000.00 had been paid. 
Attempts were made to resolve this dispute, all without 
success. 
In January of 1971, the Plaintiff filed a Complaint, and 
in the First Cause of Action asked the Court to interpret the 
1964 contract, the Rasmussen contract, and to determine the 
Plaintiff's and the Defendant's respective rights thereunder. 
(R.5) The Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action asked the Court 
to determine that the execution of the Rasmussen contract 
constituted a form of novation as to the 1964 contract, and 
that the Plaintiff should receive 65.81 percent of the funds 
received by the parties on the Rasmussen contract. 
Defendant filed an Answer and a Counter-claim (R.25). 
In answer to the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action, the 
Defendant stated as follows: 
. . . defendant admits and alleges that it is expedient 
and desirable that the court interpret and declare the 
true meaning of the contracts referred to as Exhibt 
"A" and in Exhibit "B" and direct Walker Bank & 
Trust Company as escrow holder to disburse funds 
3 
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received for credit of Plaintiff and Defendant herein 
in accordance with the true intent and meaning of 
said contracts, Exhibit "A" and Exhibit "B" . 
The Defendant generally denied the allegations contained 
in Plaintiff's Second Cause of Action. As a Counter-claim 
the Defendant alleged that certain payments had been made 
on the 1964 contract for which he was entitled to credit, and 
in his prayer asked: 
3. That the court interpret and declare the effect of 
said contracts, Exhibit "A" and Exhibit " B " in the 
light of facts and circumstances hereinabove set 
forth . . . 
The Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendant's Counter-claim, 
(R.37) asking the Court to examine the 1964 contract and 
the Rasmussen contract, and admitting: 
. . . that a disagreement has developed between the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant as to the distribution of 
monies to be received under the Rasmussen contract, 
and that when the Defendant attempted to have the 
Walker Bank disburse funds to him alone the bank 
was instructed to follow the original Escrow and 
Agreement, and did so by disbursing funds at a latter 
date to the Plaintiff and Defendant as per their written 
authorization, 
and otherwise generally dening the allegations of the Defend-
ant's Counter-claim. 
The parties engaged in some discovery and a pre-trial 
hearing was brought by the Court on April 3,1972, at Nephi, 
Utah. At the pre-trial the Defendant argued that the 
Rasmussen contract did not amount to a sale, and that he was 
not required to divide any excess over $40,000.00, (the 
1964 contract purchase price) until the Defendant himself 
4 
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had received some excess over $40,000.00 on the sale of the 
property. This matter was argued to the Court and later a 
memorandum was submitted by the parties for the Court's 
consideration. At the Court's request, Counsel for Plaintiff 
prepared a pre-trial order, but the same was not signed 
because of Defendant's objections. 
The matter was set for trial before the Court on June 
26, 1972, at Nephi, Utah. The Plaintiff was present and 
represented by her counsel. She had witnesses ready to 
testify and James R. Meldrum was sworn and testified in 
behalf of the Plaintiff. After James R. Meldrum had testified, 
the Defendant requested additional time to introduce evi-
dence in opposition to the testimony of James R. Meldrum. 
The request for an extention of time was granted to the 
Defendant by the Court. In order to expedite the hearing of 
the matter, the Plaintiff stipulated that the testimony of 
James R. Meldrum could be striken, and that the Plaintiff 
would stipulate as to the value of the lifestock and machinery 
which the Defendant had sold, and which were not included 
in the Rasmussen contract, but which were included in the 
1964 contract. (R.52) 
On March 7, 1973, the Court filed a Memorandum 
Decision (R. 87) in which is was determined that the 1964 
contract was not modified, amended or novated by the 
Rasmussen contract as alleged in Plaintiff's Second Cause 
of Action. Plaintiff's First Cuase of Action, (the interpreta-
tion of the 1964 contract,) was the only question to be 
decided by the Court. 
5 
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Although the Plaintiff's First Cause of Action had 
not been acted upon, the Defendant submitted to the Court 
proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judg-
ment. These indicated payments made by defendant to the 
Plaintiff in sums greater than had previously been alleged in 
Plaintiff's or Defendant's pleadings, or Answers to Interroga-
tories, or any evidence before the Court; and in addition 
thereof awarded Judgment to the defendant for interest 
at the legal rate on the amount of funds to which 
the Defendant is found to be entitled from the date 
when said funds were received by said escrow agent, 
to-wit, August 18, 1972. 
and a reasonable attorney's fee for Defendant's attorney. 
Said Conclusions of Law and Judgment provided that the 
Defendant was to receive a sum certain from the Escrow 
agent with interest thereon. The balance, if any, should be 
paid to the Plaintiff. The matter of the interpretation of the 
1964 contractus requested in Plaintiff's First Cause of Action 
and the Defendant's Counter-claim, was not considered in the 
proposed Findings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment. (Court 
Exhibit "A"). 
The matter was before the Court on April 10, 1973, in 
regards to the several motions that had been filed, the Def-
endant's proposed Findings, and Plaintiff's objections thereto. 
The matter was taken under advisement. While the matter 
was under advisement, the Defendant submitted revised 
proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment, Demands for Answers to Interrogatories, Motion 
to Rule upon Legal Issues and several other documents. 
6 
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Finally on November 13, 1973, the case came on for further 
hearing. Plaintiff's exhibits P-l, P-2, P-3 and P-4 were offered 
by Plaintiff, not objected to by the Defendant, and received 
by the Court. Defendant's exhibits D-l, D-2, D-3, D-4 and 
D-5 were offered by the Defendent but were objected to by 
the Plaintiff and the objection was sustained. The Court 
then directed Counsel for the Plaintiff to submit revised 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and 
allowed the Defendant ten days after receipt of same to 
file objections. The Plaintiff submitted revised Findings, 
Conclusions and Judgment (R.159-168), and the Defendant 
filed objections thereto. (R.182). 
On December 11, 1973, the case came on before the 
Court on the pending motions and objections (R.156, Tr. 
B-l) and for trial to follow the criminal calender. The 
parties each offered testimony and other evidence in behalf 
of their respective claims. The Court took the case under 
advisement and later signed the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Judgment which interpreted the 1964 contract, 
as requested by the parties. These were filed with the Clerk 
of the Court on March 4,1974. Defendant then filed a motion 
for new trial which was overruled. He later filed this appeal. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT IN POINTS I AND II OF HIS ARGU-
MENT AGAIN IGNORES PLAINTIFF'S FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION AND HIS OWN COUNTER-CLAIM WHICH RE-
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
QUEST AN INTERPRETATION OF THE 1964 CONTRACT 
ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE PARTIES. 
The Defendant in his Point I sets out several payments 
that he alleges to have been made to the Plaintiff by the Def-
endant and other payments made by the Defendant on 
other mortgages for which he is to receive credit, for the 
purpose of showing that the Defendant was not in default 
on the contract at the time of the commencement of this 
action. The Court made no finding that the Defendant was in 
fact in default on the contract at the time of the commence-
ment of the action, and did not need to do so. The parties 
had requested an interpretation of the 1964 contract and 
specifically paragraph 5. C. c. 
The Defendant then goes on further to state in his First 
Point that he had offered to settle the dispute many times 
with the Plaintiff in accordance with his interpretation of the 
1964 contract. He completely ignored the fact that the ques-
tion before the Court was the interpretation of the 1964 con-
tract. The Plaintiff requested the Court to determine in 
accordance with Paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract, 
after the Defendant had sold his interest in the real property 
to Rasmussen, when, and how much money the Defendant 
was to pay to the Plaintiff. 
POINT III 
THE OFFERING OF A PRE-TRIAL SETTLEMENT 
OF A CLAIM IS NOT ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE. 
8 
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The Defendant in Point III of his argument contends 
that the Court erred in rejecting letters that Defendant's 
Counsel had written to Plaintiff's Counsel setting out offers 
of compromise. 
The general rule is that evidence of offerings to settle 
out of court is not admissible in an action between the 
parties. The philosophy underlying this feeling stems from 
the attempt of the courts to foster out of court settlements. 
The settlement would not be accomplished if the parties 
thought their negotiations would be admissible in court to 
impute liability or guilt. No Utah decisions have addressed 
this subject, but other jurisdictions have strongly embraced 
the rule. 
Offers made in an effort to compromise an action are 
not admissible against the party in any court action. 
— State Highway Commission V. Arms, 518 P. 2d 35, 
(1974). Montana 
Offers in effort to settle eminent domain proceedings 
are inadmissible for evidence at trial on eminent do-
main proceedings. — People v. Southern Pacific Trans. 
Corp., 109 Cal Rptr 525, (1973) Califor: 
Offers to settle between parties to a lawsuit are not 
admissible. — Vorkmelker v. Oleksinski, 199 N. W. 
2d 287, (Mich. App. 1972) Michigan 
9 
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Public policy favoring settlement of disputed claims 
without litigation prohibits admission of evidence of 
unaccepted offers of settlement. — Dutch Hill Inc. vs. 
Patten, 303 A.2d 811 (1973) Vermont. 
POINT IV 
THE REVIEWING COURT SHOULD RESPECT THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS UNLESS THERE IS A PRE-
PONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY. 
The appellant in his argument under Points IV and 
V of his brief claims that the Court erred in not making 
certain Findings, and in its interpretation of the contract. 
At no time during the course of this case did the Defendant 
offer any evidence of the payments made on the contract, 
but tried to have the Court accept said evidence based 
on his proposed Findings. The Plaintiff stipulated to all 
items included in the Court's Findings. The Court was 
then left with the job of interpreting the 1964 contract, 
based upon the document itself, and the evidence as stipulated 
to by the parties. 
The rule of law is well established in Utah, that the 
reviewing Court will not overturn the trial Court's Findings 
and Judgment unless there is a preponderance of evidence 
that will not support the Findings and Judgment. 
Members of the appellant court do not have the 
opportunity to hear the witnesses and see their de-
meanor in court and on the witness stand and are not 
in as good of position to weigh the evidence as is the 
trial judge or jury. It is our duty on appeal to affirm 
the trial court in its findings of fact where there is 
competant evidence to affirm those findings. — Nance 
v. City of Provo, 29 Utah 2d 340, 509 P.2d 365, 
(1973). 
10 
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Inasmuch as there is substantial, reasonable, and 
credible evidence to support his finding, it is not our 
prerogative to upset it. — Keller v. Deseret Mortuary 
Co., 23 Utah 2dl, 455 P.2d 197, (1969). 
The foundational rule of this aspect of the procedure 
is that it is the trial judge's prerogative to find the 
facts; . . . it is therefore more accurate to say that on 
review we survey the evidence in the light favorable 
to the findings, whichever party they may favor, and 
they are supported by substantial evidence. —Bramel 
v. State Road Commission, 24 Utah 2d 50, 465 P. 2d 
534, (1970) 
Branch v. Western Factors Inc., 28 Utah 2d 361, 
502 P.2d 570 (1972). 
Dockstader v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P. 2d 
526, (1973). 
Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 361 P. 2d 
1114, (1961). 
Paulsen v. Coombs, 123 Utah 49, 253 P.2d 621, 
(1953). 
The Court was asked to interpret paragraph 5. C. c. 
of the 1964 contract which read as follows: 
That in the event that buyer sells his interest in the 
above described property or assigns this contract 
during the lifetime of the seller for a sum in excess 
of the purchase price herein, Forty Thousand Dollars 
($40,000.00), that in such event he will pay one-half 
of the excess thereof over $40,000.00 to the seller 
herein, from the first three payments under such sale. 
The Court interrupted the foregoing paragraph of the 1964 
contract to mean that the Plaintiff was entitled to all 
benefits that such sale might bring about, including principal 
and interest. The Court than made a Finding to the effect that 
the increase in the sale price of the real and personal 
property was $38,050.00, of which the Plaintiff was entitled 
11 
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to one-half as per terms of the 1964 contract, being the sum 
of $19,025.00, plus interest; which Finding should stand. 
POINT V 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING THE DE-
FENDANT JUDGMENT FOR INTEREST AND FOR HIS 
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The appellant in his Point VI claims that the Court 
erred in denying him Judgment for interest and attorney's 
fees. 
What the Defendant fails to recognize is that the Court 
did not accept his interpretation of the 1964 contract, and 
specifically found the 1964 contract to mean that the Plain-
tiff was entitled to all benefits that such sale (Rasmussen 
sale) might bring about including principal and interest. The 
Court's logical interpretation of the 1964 contract amounted 
to a finding for the Plaintiff and against the Defendant. 
Specifically against the Defendant's illogical interpretation 
of paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract. 
Inasmuch as the Court found against the Defendant, then 
it must of necessity not award the Defendant his costs and 
attorney's fee. Further the Court did not err in not granting 
the Defendant Judgment for interest where the case was 
found against him, and the fact that he had not requested 
same in any of his pleadings. 
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put to 
issue at the trial cannot be considered for the first 
time on appeal. —Wagner V. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 
370, 482 P2d 702, (1971). 
12 
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POINT VI 
WHEN THE MATTER IS AT ISSUE AND SET FOR 
TRIAL, AND THE PLAINTIFF AT THE TRIAL, PRESENTS 
HIS EVIDENCE, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD BE READY 
TO PRESENT HIS EVIDENCE, AND A REQUEST FOR A 
CONTINUANCE OF SEVERAL DAYS OR WEEKS TO 
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO SECURE ADDITIONAL EVI-
DENCE WAS PROPERLY DENIED. 
After a condiserable period of time, and several hearings 
on Motions and Objections to proposed Findings of Fact, etc., 
the Court set the case for trial to follow the criminal calen-
dar. Plaintiff was present with witnesses and offered testimony 
at the trial of the case that day. The defendant did not 
testify, but his counsel attempted to offer in evidence two 
letters which he claimed to have received from the escrow 
agent. When counsel for the Plaintiff objected to the intro-
duction of these two letters, counsel for the Defendant was 
then sworn and testified concerning offers of settlement and 
the receipt of the two letters, which again the Court rejected, 
upon the objection of Plaintiff's Counsel. This evidence, 
which the Defendant proposed to offer, was completely new 
to the Plaintiff, having never been brought out in any of the 
pleadings or interrogatories previously filed. Upon the Court's 
refusal to allow the introduction of said letters, counsel for 
the Defendant requested a continuance for the purpose of 
making arrangments to bring the escrow agent before the 
Court at a later date. It was in the late afternoon when this 
request was made, the escrow agent was in Provo, and the 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case was being tried in Nephi. It would have been impossible 
to of had the witness brought before the Court that day, 
Particularly since the Defendant had never contacted the 
witness and advised him of the trial. 
This matter had been pending for many months. The 
Defendant was advised of the trial date and should have been 
prepared with his witnesses to present the evidence that he 
desired at the trial. The evidence that he offered covered only 
a minor matter concerning a small payment claimed to have 
been made to the Plaintiff for the benefit of the Defendant. 
The proffered evidence had no bearing whatsoever on the 
major issue of the case, the interpretation of paragraph 5. 
C. c. of the 1964 contract. At the first trial the case was con-
tinued at Defendant's request because he did not have 
witnesses or other evidence ready to present to the Court 
on that date. To again grant the Defendant a continuance of 
the trial for such a minor matter would have been improper, 
and a basis for Plaintiff to have claimed substantial error. 
The Court's denying Defendant's Motion for a continuance 
to permit Defendant to produce evidence of payments made 
by the Escrow agent for which the Defendant claimed he was 
entitled to credit, was entirely proper. 
CONCLUSION 
The brief of the appellant is a repetitious rehash of 
Defendant's arguments before the Trial Court. Defendant's 
counsel would not accept the fact that others, including 
Plaintiff's counsel and the Court, might interpret paragraph 
5. C. c. of the 1964 contract different from what he did. 
Therefore, throughout all the hearings and trial of the case, he 
14 
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attempted only to show the offers of settlement he had 
made in accordance with his interpretation of the contract, 
without at any time arguing the interpretation of the contract 
before the Court, or asking the Court to so accept his inter-
pretation. 
The appellant in his reply brief has done the same thing. 
He has not at any time indicated that the Court erred in its 
interpretation of paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract. 
Rather, he has assumed that everyone accepted his interpre-
tation of the contract (without stating what his interpreta-
tion of the paragraph 5. C. c. of the 1964 contract was), and 
then based on his interpretation of the contract has cited 
points wherein he believes the Court was in error. None of 
these points would be in error if the Court's interpretation of 
the 1964 contract was accepted. 
The trial judge execised great patience and understand-
ing in trying this case, and should be commended therefor. 
His decision should stand, and the Plaintiff should have her 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending this action. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Richard L. Maxfield, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
(Respondent) 
15 
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